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Goldilocks, a/k/a Goldy Locks
v. State -
(A Mythical Appeal With an Equally Mythical
Opinion)
by Richard P. Gilbert*
We are told that the children of today are exposed
through television to violence and crime which is pack-
aged and delivered into the home, generally, free of
charge, under the heading of entertainment. There are
those who oppose the violence of television and who cry
out for a "return to yesteryear, the days of fairy tales and
Mothergoose so that we may instill in our children what
we learned."
We herein examine Mothergoose's "Goldilocks," a
harmless story for children - or is it? Suppose Goldilocks,
instead of making good her escape from the home of the
three bears, had been apprehended. Suppose further she
had been charged and convicted, and as long as we are
so supposing, let's go one more step and suppose it all
happened in Maryland. The writer suggests that if the
case were appealed the Court's opinion might read as
follows:
The case was argued before LEARNED, STRAIT AND
WORDY, JJ. Per Curiam.
THE FACTS
The record reveals that Mr. & Mrs. Bear, accompanied
by their minor son, left their residence to go for a walk in
the forest while a meal, prepared for the family by Mrs.
Bear, was cooling. Apparently, the appellant, a small girl
named Goldilocks, a/k/a Goldy Locks, happened upon
the Bear home shortly after the Bears had departed. The
front door was, according to appellant, "open." She went
into the house. She then sat in the chairs that she discov-
ered in the living room, trying each of them for comfort
and finally setting upon that used by the minor child of
the Bears. Goldilocks' olfactory organ detected the aroma
of the dinner that Mrs. Bear has set out to cool, whereup-
on Goldilocks sampled from each of the three bowls that
were on the kitchen table. She completely devoured the
food that had been placed in the smallest of the bowls.
Appellant then began to explore the house. She
"bounced" on each of the three beds that she located on
the second floor. She, without removing so much as her
shoes, slipped into the smallest of the beds and fell
asleep.
*A.A., J.D., LL.M., University of Baltimore; Chief Judge Court of
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Meanwhile, a pigeon, unidentified in the record ex-
cept by the code name "Stooly," advised the Bears to,
"Go back! Go back!"
The family promptly returned to their dwelling where
they discovered that someone had been sitting in each of
the living room chairs. Two of the bowls of porridge, the
meal prepared by Mrs. Bear, were either "drowned in
milk" or "swimming in treacle." The third bowl was
empty. Alarmed at the fact that someone had entered the
house while they were absent, the Bears quickly com-
menced an inventory in order to ascertain whether any-
thing had been taken. The bedrooms were inspected. In
Mr. Bear's room, the quilts had been thrown on the floor.
Mrs. Bear discovered that her sheets were "mussed" and
her cosmetics were strewn about the room. Her lipstick
was missing. The minor Bear suddenly discovered the
appellant in his bed. When the family gathered around
the bed, the appellant awoke. She tangled Mrs. Bear in
the sheets, gingerly avoided the grasp of Mr. Bear, and
fled the house at full speed. The Bears followed in hot
pursuit but eventually lost her trail in the forest. The
police were summoned and furnished with a description
of the intruder. Subsequently, acting upon information
received from an unidentified confidential informant,
Goldilocks was apprehended. All three of the Bears iden-
tified Goldilocks through the use of a photographic line-
up and she was then charged. The Grand Jury of Balti-
more City indicted Goldilocks in a multiple count indict-
ment alleging that she: 1) broke and entered the dwelling
house of the Bears, a violation of Md. Ann. Code, art. 27,
§ 31A;' 2) stole goods valued at less than $300, a viola-
tion of Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 341(a);2 3) received
"stolen money, goods or chattels under the value of
$100, knowing it to be stolen." Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
467;3 4) acted as a rogue and vagabond, a violation of
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 490; 4 5) trespassed for the
purpose of invading the privacy of the occupants, a viola-
tion of Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 580; 6) entered a
bawdyhouse, Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 15(f).'
'The offense is a misdeameanor punishable by imprisonment for not
more than three (3) years or a fine of not more than $500 or both.
2A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 18
months or a fine of not more than $100 or both. Md. Ann. Code art.
27, § 342(f)(2). Prior to Laws 1976, ch. 294, § 1, the maximum fine
was $100. Effective July 1, 1979, there is a new comprehensive theft
statute. See Laws 1978, ch. 849. New section 341 consolidates the
prior crimes of larceny, larceny by trick, larceny after trust, embezzle-
ment, false pretenses, shoplifting and receiving stolen property into the
crime of "theft."
3See n. 2, supra. The penalty for the offense is the same as that
prescribed for violating section 341.
4The offense is a misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of three
(3) years imprisonment.
5Subsection (f) proscribes entering a structure or building "for the pur-
pose of prostitution, lewdness or assignation." The penalty is not more
than one year, a fine of $500, or both.
FORUM
A jury, presided over by Judge I. M. Mean, in the
Criminal Court, convicted Goldilocks of counts 1, 2, 3,
and 5. She was adjudged to be not guilty of count 4, and
the jury handed down no decision with respect to count
6. Ergo, under our law, the "no decision" or "draw"
allows the State, should it so desire, to try the appellant
again on that count. Md. Rule 759 d. A pool of the jury at
the appellant's request, Md. Rule 759 e, sustained the
verdict as announced.
After a motion for a new trial was argued and denied,
the appellant was committed to the jurisdiction of the
Division of Correction for a total of six years; i.e., three
years on count 1; one year, count 2; two years, count 3.
Sentence on count 5 was suspended generally.
In this Court, Goldilocks asserts:
1. The trial judge erred in not suppressing the pre-
trial photographic line-up.
2. The trial judge erred in imposing cruel and un-
usual punishment.
3. She was denied a fair and impartial trial because
of the incompetency of her trial counsel.
4. The evidence is insufficient to support the convic-
tions.
5. The larceny and receiving verdicts are inconsis-
tent.
6. She was denied her constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
7. The court erred in not waiving the appellant to
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
We shall discuss the issues in the order that appellant
posited them to us.
I.
PHOTOGRAPHIC LINE-UP.
Prior to trial, the appellant, in one of a series of motions
filed in accordance with Md. Rule 736, sought to suppress
the photographic identification the Bears had made of
her. Md. Rule 736 a 2. At the hearing conducted by
Judge Mean, evidence was adduced showing that Goldi-
locks had been placed in a line-up, the line-up was photo-
graphed and that photograph was later shown to each of
the three Bears, individually and out of the presence of
each other. All three readily identified the appellant as the
person who fled from their home after having been
awakened by them.
The difficulty with the identification is, as appellant
argues, and the State agrees, that it was "impermissively
suggestive" and, consequently, violative of Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d
1247 (1968); Estep v. State, 14 Md. App. 53, 286 A.2d
6Md. Rule 759 d provides that "When there are two or more counts, the
jury at any time may return a verdict with respect to a count as to which
it has agreed, any count as to which the jury cannot agree can be tried
again."
187 (1972); Crenshaw v. State, 13 Md. App. 361, 283
A.2d 423 (1971, cert. denied, 264 Md. 746 (1972);
Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057 (1970).
It is apparent from the photograph that the appellant,
with her golden hair falling in locks about her shoulders,
was placed with a group of four other persons; all were
male. One had a crew-cut, one was bald-headed, one
was red-headed, and one had long black, shoulder length
hair, as well as a flowing beard. Judge Mean, without
assigning a reason, overruled the motion to suppress the
photographic identification, thus proving, as Jim Oigan
7
often stated, "Trial judges must do or die, appellate
judges have to reason why."
Indubitably, the photographic identification should
have been suppressed. To opine that it was "impermiss-
ibly suggestive" is to understate. The line-up procedure
utilized did more than offer a "suggestion" of identifica-
tion; it pointed directly to the appellant and stopped just
short of having her wear a neon sign around her neck
identifying her as the perpetrator of the crimes. Indeed,
under the circumstances, such a sign would have
amounted to "gilding the lily." The failure to suppress
was blatant error. Nevertheless, the error does not cry out
for reversal because there was evidence that the Bears
grounded their in-court identification of the appellant
upon their observation of her while she was asleep in the
bed belonging to minor Bear, as well as the opportunity
to see her during her successful effort to flee the scene.
Each of the Bears told the court and jury at trial that their
identification was not in any wise influenced by the
photograph of the line-up, but rather by their indepen-
dent observations.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401
(1972), enunciated five factors that are to be considered
in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification under the
"totality of the circumstances." Those factors are:
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the crim-
inal at the time of the crime,
[2] the witness' degree of attention [to the
offender],
[3] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of
the criminal,
[4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the wit-
ness at the confrontation,
[5] the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation." 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct.
at 382, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411.
'See n. 1, Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 35 Md. App. 19, 369 A.2d 133
(1977).
See also Foster v. State, 272 Md. 273, 323 A.2d 419
(1974); Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 335 A.2d
124 (1974); Witcher v. State, 17 Md. App. 426, 320 A.2d
701 (1973).
Our constitutionally mandated, independent review of
the evidence relative to the identification of the appellant'
by the Bears discloses that they did, indeed, have ample
opportunity to observe the appellant while she lay sleep-
ing in the bed of the youngest Bear. The witness's de-
scription of the appellant as given to the police
immediately following the incident matched that of appel-
read and stated he understood. However, he refused to
appellant when she was found in the bed. Moreover, the
identification of Goldilocks by all three Bears was une-
quivocal and immediate. Although there is no evidence
as to the length of time between the crime and the
identification of appellant by the victims, on balance, the
State has met its burden under Neil v. Biggers, supra.
Therefore, even though the failure to suppress the photo-
graphic identification was error, that error was, under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, harmless beyond a




The sentence meted to the appellant falls within the
statutory limits. There is nothing within the record to
indicate that the terms imposed were dictated by passion,
ill will, or other unworthy motive. Mahoney v. State, 13
Md. App. 105, 281 A.2d 421 (1971), cert. denied, 264
Md. 750, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 978 (1972). See also
Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 37, 262 A.2d 325 (1970);
Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d 113 (1969). The
contention is devoid of merit.
III.
INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL
The allegation that trial counsel was incompetent is
grounded on the admission of the photographic identifi-
cation and the failure to move to dismiss the indictment
on the basis of a denial of a speedy trial. We note that
counsel did all he could reasonably be expected to do to
prevent the admission of the photographic identification.
The assertion that he was somehow incompetent because
that evidence was improperly admitted is without any
justification. Furthermore, we have already seen that the
FORUM
admission of the photographic identification was, while
error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v.
State, supra.
In any event, the issue of competency of counsel was
not raised and decided in the trial court. It is not before
us. Md. Rule 1085. If appellant is aggrieved by the type of
legal representation she received from her attorney, she
has adequate means of seeking redress through the Post
Conviction Procedure Act. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
645A.
We shall address the matter of speedy trial infra.
IV.
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
We have set out at length, in the recitation of the facts,
the evidence as produced at trial. It would be redundant
to repeat it. Suffice it to say that the evidence, as re-
counted above, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient
to sustain the convictions. The test for the "sufficiency of
the evidence in a criminal case is whether the admissible
evidence adduced at trial shows directly or supports a
rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which
the jury could fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the defendant's guilt of the offense charged."
James v. State, 14 Md. App. 689, 288 A.2d 644 (1972);
King v. State, 14 Md. App. 385, 287 A.2d 52 (1972);
Frankis v. State, 11 Md. App. 534, 275 A.2d 532 (1971).
Patently, the evidence meets the test.
V.
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS.
Goldilocks asserts that she cannot be guilty of larceny
of goods and also guilty of receiving those self-same
goods. She argues that the trial judge should have
granted a dismissal as to one of the offenses. We agree. A
defendant cannot be both a thief and receiver of the same
goods. Beard v. State, -- _Md. App. -, 399 A.2d
1383 (1979); Cross v. State, 36 Md. App. 502, 374 A.2d
620 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Md. 468, 386
A.2d 757 (1978); Hinton v. State, 36 Md. App. 52, 373
A.2d 39 (1977); Fletcher v. State, 231 Md. 190, 189
A.2d 641 (1963); Hardesty v. State, 223 Md. 559, 165
A.2d 761 (1960); Bell v. State, 220 Md. 75, 150 A.2d
908 (1959); Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128
(1945). When, as here, the jury renders inconsistent ver-
dicts, the better practice is to ask "the jury to return to the
jury room and, if they were intent upon returning a
verdict of guilty" of larceny, then to return a verdict of not
guilty to the receiving. McDuffie v. State, 12 Md. App.
264, 278 A.2d 307 (1971). Deviations from the "better
practice" have been allowed, however, by the Court of
Appeals and this Court. When the trial judge has imposed
but one sentence on the inconsistent verdicts, the defen-
dant suffered no prejudice, and no new trial was war-
ranted. McDuffie v. State, supra; Novak v. State, 139 Md.
538, 115 A. 853 (1921). The fallacy, if any, in that
reasoning is that concurrent sentences may affect parole
so that it would seem to be more advisable either to
return the jury to the jury room for reconsideration or for
the trial judge to grant a judgment of acquittal on the
receiving count. McDuffie v. State, supra.
Because, in the matter sub judice, the verdicts were
inconsistent, the trial judge should have instructed the
jury to reconsider its action with respect to the inconsis-
tent counts. Alternatively, he should have granted a judg-
ment of acquittal on the receiving charge. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as the judgments are being vacated for reasons
hereinafter set forth, the matter is largely academic.
VI.
DENIAL OF A SPEEDY TRIAL.
As interesting as this penultimate issue would be, it is
not before us inasmuch as it was not raised in the trial
court. No motion to dismiss because of a failure to pro-
vide appellant with a speedy trial was ever made. We do
not consider it. Md. Rule 1085. The appellant, however,
is not left without a manner in which to test the denial of a
speedy trial. This is so because, for the reasons stated in
part VII of this opinion, the judgments are vacated. At the
appropriate time appellant may seek dismissal of the
charges on the premise that she has been denied a
speedy trial. We are not to be understood, however, as
indicating that the charges should be dismissed for failure
to afford appellant a speedy trial. We merely point out
"LET'S GO TO
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SWEET TOOTH."
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Ultimately, Goldilocks complains that Judge Mean
erred in refusing to waive her case to the Juvenile Court.
The trial judge observed that Goldilocks was well beyond
the age limitations of the Juvenile authorities, stating that
she was around when he was a child. Thus, he concluded
that she, of necessity, was an adult and, therefore, subject
to the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court.
Ordinarily, persons under the age of 18 years are sub-
ject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a
crime. Md. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann §
3-804(a) states flatly that the juvenile court has "exclusive
original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be delinquent."
There are, however, exceptions to section 3-804(a). Sec-
tions 3-804(d) and (e) provide:
"(d) The court does not have jurisdiction over:
(1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have
done an act which, if committed by an adult,
would be a crime punishable by death or life
imprisonment, as well as all other charges against
the child arising out of the same incident, unless
an order removing the proceeding to the court has
been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27;
(2) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have
done an act in violation of any provision of the
Transportation Article or other traffic law or ordi-
,nance, except an act that prescribes a penalty of
incarceration;
(3) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have
done an act in violation of any provision of law,
rule, or regulation governing the use or operation
of a boat, except an act that prescribes a penalty of
incarceration;
(4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have
committed the crime of robbery with a deadly
weapon as well as all other charges against the
child arising out of the same incident, unless an
order removing the proceeding to the court has
been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27.
(e) If the child is charged with two or more
violations of the Maryland Vehicle Law, another
traffic law or ordinance, or the State Boat Act,
allegedly arising out of the same incident and
which would result in the child being brought be-
fore both the court and a court exercising criminal
jurisdiction, the court has exclusive jurisdiction
over all of the charges."
None of the offenses allegedly committed by Goldi-
locks falls within the scope of the exceptions to Courts art.
§ 3-804(a). Thus, it appears that the charges should have
originated in the juvenile court. If the State desires to
prosecute Goldilocks in a criminal court, they must first
obtain a waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court judge.
Courts art. § 3-817. Current Courts art. § 3-807 pro-
scribes prosecution for a criminal offense of any child
under the age of 18, unless the juvenile court has waived
jurisdiction. If the accused is over age 21 at the time the
matter is taken before the juvenile court, even though the
offense was committed while the accused was a child, the
court still has "exclusive original jurisdiction but only for
the purpose of waiving it." This does not mean, however,
that waiver is mandatory. In re Appeals. Nos. 1022 &
1081, 278 Md. 174, 178-79, 359 A.2d 556 (1976). The
court is still required, irrespective of the fact that the
accused is over 21 years of age, to conduct the waiver
hearing required by section 3-817.
Sometimes, as here, the State, because of the nature of
the offense and the age of the accused, proceeds directly
to the criminal courts. If the charges against the accused
are such as to vest jurisdiction exclusively in the Criminal
Court, Courts art. § 3-804(d)(1) or (d)(4), the court may,
pursuant to Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A(a), invoke
what has become known stylistically as "Reserve Waiv-
er" and transfer the case to the juvenile court, provided
the criminal court believes the waiver to be in the best
interest of the child.
In the instant case, Goldilocks requested a "Reserve
Waiver", but it was denied. The denial was, as we have
seen, correct, but merely because of form, not substance.
None of the charged offenses falls within those over
which the Criminal Court possesses exclusive control.
See Courts art. § 3-804(d)(1) and (d)(4). The Criminal
Court should have dismissed the indictment for lack of
jurisdiction over the person. Md. Rule 736 a 2.
It may well be, as the State argues, that the vacating of
the judgments is largely academic, because the juvenile
court will waive jurisdiction. On the other hand, it may
not. It is not for us to say. The defect, however, being
jurisdictional in nature, precludes trial in the Criminal
Court until and unless a valid waiver is exercised by the
juvenile court.
What we have said with respect to waiver by the juve-
nile court applies only if Goldilocks is 15 years of age or
older. Courts art. § 3-817(a)(1). While it would seem that
she has long since passed that young and tender age,
there nevertheless remains the possibility, however re-
mote, that she belongs to that select few consisting of
Orphan Annie, Winnie Winkle, Superman, Lois Lane,
Popeye, Olive Oil, and others, for whom time stands still.
If that be the case, the juvenile court must retain jurisdic-
tion. Courts art. § 3-817(a)(1).
We vacate the judgments and remand the case to the
Criminal Court with instruction that it dismiss the indict-
ments against Goldilocks.
JUDGMENTS VACATED.
